

## INCOMPLETENESS AND THE ROMANCE OF SCIENCE

Marvin E. Kirsh  
Kirsh2152000@yahoo.com  
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### Abstract

It is argued that qualities of *complete/incomplete science theory* do not relate to the fertility or diversity or validity of science theory, but correspond with social, behavioral, moral values, and trespass into the realms of innate knowing, absolutes, cognition and behavior. It is suggested that terms employed such as "innately incomplete" are redundant in description- i.e.- "flats are innately flat"-a curved dwelling would not be suitable for habitation, it is similarly very difficult to find other words to speak of the notion of science as incomplete.

### Discussion

With regard to a notion *complete science theory*, I am not sure that, though current effort is to unfold the *inherent incompletenesses in science theory*, the meaning referred to by the words "*complete science theory*" in actuality falls into some other category than science theory. This false categorization indeed makes discussion very difficult/redundant.

Consider religion: e.g. belief, empirical justification, empirical validity. That which we attribute to existing things always parallels a known fact of the self: that they are somewhere distal, or proximal to witness. That which is distal is basically empirically untestable. That which is proximal is amenable to first hand acquaintance. If one considers these two world divisions-the *proximal* and the *distal*, in order to seek and to establish a necessary quality for distinct distant phenomenon, i.e. uniqueness, one must assume that they, or at least something of these distal phenomenon is distinct from the proximal and not common everywhere. If not, in the same sense, the word "world" could also denote a phenomenon. Thus, what exists, is not common everywhere, is necessarily somewhere, as one self is somewhere and distant thing are elsewhere. There are only these two possibilities, everywhere, or somewhere, and thus in order to discuss phenomenon that are not directly present, in assuming a specific location, we are attesting only to facts perceived of self existence(an unique entity that is somewhere). A second fact, of voluntary motion and will, though arbitrarily deleted, "of itself" delineates the living from the inert.

I wish to argue that the words complete science refer to entities in the everywhere category and have no quality of location. *Complete science*, then, refers to a theory of everything everywhere. Its meaning might be construed as a ground/grounding link to classification, ontology and epistemology-and referral to the existence of many non overlapping scientific pursuits. Not much can be readily said of it and it is asserted that a theory of science has not been achieved, and is mistaken for a collection of observations, proposed observation (though of not so little complexity) and experimental correspondences-i.e. -"that would be the way it works" It is not clear in discussions whether this fact of incompleteness is considered in science practice.

As a collection of notions that entail the existence of specific entities, the parts of modern science need not resemble the whole. A slap to bring a new born to life, details of its living and activities, bear little or no resemblance to the known biochemistry of its' construction; it is easy to become confused in the detail of the exact correspondences of entities and referrals of nomenclature over the components of an actual whole and complete theory(they may overlap) and it is important, that, from the initiation of experiment

an awareness of this notion is accomplished: At its' limits, form/structure and functioning may not only appear to merge in the immediate sense realms of empirical experience, at the outset of questions, the chain of cause and effect, but also at all levels of explanation. There does not only not exist a theory that can satisfy this requirement, it would have no practical application, but as a philosophy of science or ethics-as a guiding path to steer the pursuit of facts.

For a better analogy, consider a *finger print*. I wish to propose, that as a finger print- unique to each individual, tells of the hand, and the whole individual and not of its' activities and awareness-bears no separate space or inequality to any notion referring to the unique ID of an individual; that a real assessment the physical form of the *finger print* should have the same ontology, ordered the same, as the functioning of the individual/entity in the same manner- in its' simplest meaning, there is one unique *finger print* per individual- a unique individual has no pluralities-the set of, for example, the shape of a face/physical features, *fingerprints* cannot be considered to have but one member, an ontology able to describe both it and its path. In the naming of the collections of descriptions and (observations)/(parts from theoretical construction) as *finger prints*, a correct ontological appraisal should bear the same ontology as the whole topic, as a *finger print* with a will and ability to move. In this light, I have found that better divisions and ontology are established from no more and no less than criteria of proximal and distal , appropriate and inappropriate.

Consider in imagery an automobile(auto) and a road(terrain). The auto, assumed existing of itself, self contained, a self contained transmission ,as light or sound are transmissions, and the world a forwards progression, forwards passing as in foot ball game in which each stage parents the following stage in a way such that the auto is always the same in its' simplest description, goes and functions the same way, but is always at a different place on the playing field time to time. Each auto parents each subsequent (identical)one, but each terrain is not parented by the preceding one. The total result is a synergism of the existing, of-itself, free will of the auto and the environment. As an environmental component consider the earth as a member of the set of *terrains*- having a location, and consider a complete theory, *auto*, that is self contained (as described). A complete *auto* theory must always entail some evidence restricted to location that have qualities more of an entity/object than of *notion*, and thus the set *auto* can include both *notions* and *terrains*. However *terrain* is restricted to *terrains* and has no set members of *notions*. Thus if one wishes to define overlap with the physical notion of *miscibility*, some members of the set *auto* will be *immiscible* with the set of *terrains*, i.e. *terrain* is *miscible* with *terrain* only, *notion* with *notion* only. The world, then, has no component of *certain notions* in the absence of a *terrain*. On approach to *certainty*, *notions* assume a (*physical location*)/(*terrain*) in description, if one assumes that the process of witness is mandatory to validate the existence of something, i.e. that which exists must be somewhere and with a quality of terrain.

A *finger print* as a stop action picture:

$$Auto\{A,B/Notion_{AB},Terrain_B\} + Terrain\{B/Terrain_B\} = Fingerprint\{C/Terrain_B\}$$

can only be divided according to the features of a *terrain*; according to how a *terrain* is studied. In my opinion, in the creation of an ontology , one must also be able to describe *functioning* with the same nomenclature and ontology. *Non -Terrainious notions* , are excluded from legal test and, are not only not components of a final theory, must be immiscible with it.

In the consideration of a human *finger print* one has the possible applicable attributes to consider for nomenclature and ontology, of distance, shape, size, volume, proximal, distal, appropriate, inappropriate, witness, transmission(path, path length, time) etc with which to work to create a viable (*terraineous*) *notion*. A linear genetic sequence in terms of the genetic code are not applicable, and, would be considered as *non-terraineous* and not pertinent with respect to the events of nature, though molecular structures of code components in terms of physical geometry(lengths, distances, path lengths, transmission, etc), theoretical conjecture related to the means of its' emergence, and transmissions with respect to these parameters and not the same as the translations and propagations attributed to a genetic

code(base pairing etc), would be applicable-i.e. *terrainious*. It is very premature to experiment with clones, cloning etc. In the current usage, “science” (i.e. *innately incomplete science*) refers basically to a collection of entities with locations; *a(n) (inherently absent) complete science* with this same usage refers to objects/entities without locations, *non-terraineous notions* .

The word "*inherent*" ("*inherently incomplete*") is then valid with respect to this usage, though this usage itself is not only not what one might construe as a suitable notion for "science", it is very clumsy in honest argument ("to figure out/ explain ("all?")) . Better ontology and definitions, make for clearer thinking, easier arrived at solutions, great saving in resources, that some reorganization towards better individual and public education is of very high priority.

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